The focus of this paper is the analysis of the epistemological and practical role played bypathe/affections in Epicurus’ philosophy. Epicurus firstly considered the affections not as emotional/passional conditions, but as firm criteria of truth and more specifically as the third criterion of the canonic (i.e. the epistemological part of his philosophical system). In this article the critical reactions (in particular by the Peripatetic side: Aristocles of Messene) against the Epicurean position about the function of the affections will be investigated too. (...) Finally, two parts of this paper are devoted to the Cyrenaic tripartition ofpathe(in all likelihood, a subject criticized by Epicurus) and to the probable doctrinal relationship between Epicurus’patheand Aristotle’sNicomachean EthicsBook 2. (shrink)

In recent years, biologists and philosophers of science have argued that evolutionary theory should incorporate more seriously the idea of ‘reciprocal causation.’ This notion refers to feedback loops whereby organisms change their experiences of the environment or alter the physical properties of their surroundings. In these loops, in particular niche constructing activities are central, since they may alter selection pressures acting on organisms, and thus affect their evolutionary trajectories. This paper discusses long-standing problems that emerge when studying such reciprocal causal (...) processes between organisms and environments. By comparing past approaches to reciprocal causation from the early twentieth century with contemporary ones in niche construction theory, we identify two central reoccurring problems: All of these approaches have not been able to provide a conceptual framework that allows maintaining meaningful boundaries between organisms and environments, instead of merging the two, and integrating experiential and physical kinds of reciprocal causation. By building on case studies of niche construction research, we provide a model that is able to solve these two problems. It allows distinguishing between mutually interacting organisms and environments in complex scenarios, as well as integrating various forms of experiential and physical niche construction. (shrink)

Most formalisms for representing common-sense knowledge allow incomplete and potentially inconsistent information. When strong negation is also allowed, contradictory conclusions can arise. A criterion for deciding between them is needed. The aim of this paper is to investigate an inherent and autonomous comparison criterion, based on specificity as defined in [POO 85, SIM 92]. In contrast to other approaches, we consider not only defeasible, but also strict knowledge. Our criterion is context-sensitive, i. e., preference among defeasible rules is determined dynamically (...) during the dialectical analysis.We show how specificity can be defined in terms of two different approaches: activation sets and derivation trees. This allows us to get a syntactic criterion that can be implemented in a computationally attractive way. The resulting definitions may be applied in general rulebased formalisms. We present theorems linking both characterizations. Finally we discuss other frameworks for defeasible reasoning in which preference handling is considered explicitly. (shrink)

This paper is an introduction on the Causal Theory of Memory, one of the most discussed theories in philosophy of memory in the present days. We begin with Martin & Deutscher’s formulation of the theory, in which the authors present three criteria in order for a given mental state to be considered an instance of memory, amongst them, the famous causal criterion, which stipulates that a memory must be causally connected to the past experience. Subsequently, we discuss if these criteria (...) are necessary and sufficient for memory and we present two theories that complement these criteria with an epistemic and a phenomenological criterion, i.e., the Causal Epistemic Theory and the Causal Autonoetic Theory. We then introduce the concept of memory traces, which are, according to Martin & Deutscher, the causal link between the memory and the past experience which created this memory; we present the model of traces as structural analogues and the model of distributed traces and discuss the problems which arise for each of these models of traces. Afterwards we focus on the concept of causality and present the Causal Procedural Theory, which offers a different conception of causality that does not focus on the memory traces, but on causal process itself. Lastly, we present the theory called Discontinuism, a theory about the relation between memory and imagination, which follows directly from the Causal Theory of Memory. (shrink)

In this short note I would like to reflect again upon paragraphs 39–40 of Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus and, more specifically, on the text printed in the last critical edition by Tiziano Dorandi, which I quote below together with the critical apparatus :495 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐστι · σώματα μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔστιν, αὐτὴ ἡ αἴσθησις ἐπὶπάντων μαρτυρεῖ, καθ’ ἣν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἄδηλον τῷλογισμῷ τεκμαίρεσθαι, ὥσπερ προεῖπον. [40] τόπος δὲ εἰ500 μὴ ἦν ὃ κενὸν καὶ χώραν καὶ ἀναφῆ (...) φύσιν ὀνομάζομεν, οὐκἂν εἶχε τὰ σώματα ὅπου ἦν οὐδὲ δι’ οὗ ἐκινεῖτο, καθάπερφαίνεται κινούμενα.495–496 de scholiis glossematibusque in tribus Epicuri epistulis et in RS i, vid. Dorandi, Epicuro 277–8 496–497 σώματα καὶ κενόν duce Gass. suppl. V. d. Muehll: σώματα καὶ τόπος Us. Traditam lectionem defendere conatur Arndt 26. Vid. K. Algra, Elenchos 15 100 et D. Obbink, Philodemus On Piety. Part 1 338–9 497 σώματα ΦFP4: σώμα· τὰ BP1498 πάντων om. Φ 499 τόπος δὲ Us.: τὸ πρόσθε B1: τὸ πρόσθεν B2PΦ: πρόσθεν F Cf. Lucr. 1.426–7 et vid. Sedley, Phronesis 183–4 εἰ δὲ Φ 500 ὃ Φ: ὃ* B2: ὃν B1, ut vid.: ὂν PF ὃ post κενὸν traiecit Φ προεῖπον τὸ πρόσθεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἦν ὃ κενὸν Brieger, Seele 5 Vid. Dorandi, Epicuro 282–4 501 ἦν B: εἴη ΦFP4: ἔνι P1 502 οὐδ’ Us.: οὔτε B2PF: ὅτε B1503 περιληπτικῶς rec. (shrink)

This paper discusses the evolution of Husserl’s conception of judgement and propositional content from the lections on theory of meaning (1908) up to Ideen I (1913). It is shown that the conception of Ideen I, with the distinction between the complete noema and the noematic core, results from the fulfillment of tendences which are already present and active in Husserl’s earlier work. Along with the conception of Ideen I it is the problem of the modalities of judgement that becomes crucial, (...) from a systematical point of view. (shrink)

Proponents of enactivism should be interested in exploring what notion of action best captures the type of action-perception link that the view proposes, such that it covers all the aspects in which our doings constitute and are constituted by our perceiving. This article proposes and defends the thesis that the notion of sensorimotor dependencies is insufficient to account for the reality of human perception, and that the central enactive notion should be that of perceptual practices. Sensorimotor enactivism is insufficient because (...) it has no traction on socially dependent perceptions, which are essential to the role and significance of perception in our lives. Since the social dimension is a central desideratum in a theory of human perception, enactivism needs a notion that accounts for such an aspect. This article sketches the main features of the Wittgenstein-inspired notion of perceptual practices as the central notion to understand perception. Perception, I claim, is properly understood as woven into a type of social practices that includes food, dance, dress, music, etc. More specifically, perceptual practices are the enactment of culturally structured, normatively rich techniques of commerce of meaningful multi- and inter-modal perceptible material. I argue that perceptual practices explain three central features of socially dependent perception: attentional focus, aspects’ saliency, and modal-specific harmony-like relations. (shrink)

Is morality biologically altruistic? Does it imply a disadvantage in the struggle for existence? A positive answer puts morality at odds with natural selection, unless natural selection operates at the level of groups. In this case, a trait that is good for groups though bad for individuals can evolve. Sociobiologists reject group selection and have adopted one of two horns of a dilemma. Either morality is based on an egoistic calculus, compatible with natural selection; or morality continues tied to psychological (...) and biological altruism but not as a product of natural selection. The dilemma denies a third possibility—that psychological altruism evolves as a biologically selfish trait. I discuss the classical treatments of the paradox by Charles Darwin and Robert Trivers, focusing on the role they attribute to social emotions. The upshot is that both Darwin and Trivers sketch a natural-selection process relying on innate emotional mechanisms that render morality adaptive for individuals as well as for groups. I give additional reasons for viewing it as a form of natural, instead of only cultural, selection. (shrink)

The aim of this work is to analyse the concept of semi-sentence from a linguistic, formal and computational point of view. A semi-sentence can be characterised as a sentence which, from a grammatical perspective, is neither absolutely correct nor incorrect . This study focuses on: - a characterisation of the semi-sentences in the setting of the grammar of a language. This study will help to analyse in depth the concept of grammaticality [3]; - the correlate of semi-sentences in formal languages, (...) i.e., semi-strings, which arise from applying productions that deviate from that which is strictly permitted by the rules of grammar [6]; - a Prolog program for handling semi-grammaticality in a computational manner [2]. (shrink)

This article covers the different stages of the constitution of the person that goes beyond selfishness and self-affirmation and is formed as the inseparable unity of the metaphysical subject that is expressed in the "Other-in-the same" and "Being-for-the-other". This leads one to say that the person is intrinsically relation and exteriority that is realized in the language that transcends the inner self. This relationship, considered internally as a footprint, and in the exterior as visage, invokes a third party that establishes (...) and holds it. The person is shown as an asymmetrical relationship that I call triadic. (shrink)

I argue for the Cooperative Warrant Thesis (CWT), according to which the determinants of testimonial contents in communication are given by the practical requirements of cooperative action. This thesis distances itself from conventionalist views, according to which testimony must be strictly bounded by conventions of speech. CWT proves explanatorily better than conventionalism on several accounts. It offers a principled and accurate criterion to distinguish between testimonial and non-testimonial communication. In being goal-sensitive, this criterion captures the role of weak and robust (...) cooperation in determining the contents to which speakers testify or fail to testify. And, finally, it yields a principled explanation of why testimony entails the epistemic commitments that distinguish it as an epistemic source. (shrink)

Sober and Wilson have recently claimed that evolutionary theory can do what neither philosophy nor experimental psychology have been able to, namely, "break the deadlock" in the egoism vs. altruism debate with an argument based on the reliability of altruistic motivation. I analyze both their reliability argument and the experimental evidence of social psychology in favor of altruism in terms of the folk-psychological "laws" and inference patterns underlying them, and conclude that they both rely on the same patterns. I expose (...) the confusions that have led Sober and Wilson to defend a reliability argument while rejecting the experimental evidence of social psychology. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose to analyse two objections raised by Turner Jr in his paper “On Two Reasons Christian Theologians Should Reject The Intermediate State” in order to show that the intermediate state is an incoherent theory. As we shall see, the two untoward consequences that he mentions do not imply a metaphysical or logical contradiction. Consequently, I shall defend an Intermediate State and I shall propose briefly one metaphysical conception of the human being able to reply to Turner (...) Jr’s objections. (shrink)

This short paper is a critical note of the recent volume on the pseudo-Platonic dialogue Axiochus edited by A. Beghini ([Platone], Assioco. Saggio introduttivo, edizione critica, traduzione e commento, Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag, 2020). This scholar assumes the possibility of attributing the dialogue to Philo of Larissa or his circle. This hypothesis, although well argued in the book, faces some exegetical difficulties concerning the content of the dialogue and the hardly reconstructible philosophy of Philo himself. In this note I will critically (...) discuss the conclusions reached by Beghini in his prestigious book starting from the (alleged) sceptical vein which would be present in the pseudo-Platonic work, whose dating likely presupposes (also) the Epicurean conception of death. (shrink)

Intellectual progress involves forming a more accurate picture of the world. But it also figuring out which concepts to use for theorizing about the world. Bayesian epistemology has had much to say about the former aspect of our cognitive lives, but little if at all about the latter. I outline a framework for formulating questions about conceptual change in a broadly Bayesian framework. By enriching the resources of Epistemic Utility Theory with a more expansive conception of epistemic value, I offer (...) a picture of our cognitive economy on which adopting new conceptual tools can sometimes be epistemically rational. (shrink)

Recent developments in evolutionary game theory argue the superiority of punishment over reciprocity as accounts of large-scale human cooperation. I introduce a distinction between a behavioral and a psychological perspective on reciprocity and punishment to question this view. I examine a narrow and a wide version of a psychological mechanism for reciprocity and conclude that a narrow version is clearly distinguishable from punishment, but inadequate for humans; whereas a wide version is applicable to humans but indistinguishable from punishment. The mechanism (...) for reciprocity in humans emerges as a meta-norm that governs both retaliation and punishment. I make predictions open to empirical investigation to confirm or disconfirm this view. (shrink)

I argue that Husserl’s concept of position-taking, Stellungnahme, is adequate to understand the idea of second nature as an issue of philosophical anthropology. I claim that the methodological focus must be the living subject that acts and lives among others, and that the notion of second nature must respond to precisely this fundamental active character of subjectivity. The appropriate concept should satisfy two additional desiderata. First, it should be able to develop alongside the biological, psychological, and social individual development. Second, (...) it should be able to underlie the vast diversity of human beings within and across communities. As possible candidates, I contrast position-taking with two types of habit-like concepts: instinct and habitus, on the one hand, and customary habits, on the other. I argue that position-taking represents the active aspect of the subject while the habit-like concepts are passive. A subject’s position-takings and ensuing comportments are tied together by motivations, which evince a certain consistency, and for this reason are expression of the subject’s identity. I conclude by nuancing the relation between Stellungnahme and passivity. Passivity is deemed necessary to action but subservient to it; position-taking is thought to be prior to passivity. (shrink)

Individual and group selection are usually conceived as opposed evolutionary processes. Though cases of synergy are occasionally recognized, the evolutionary importance of synergy is largely ignored. However, synergy is the plausible explanation for the evolution of collectives as higher level individuals i.e., collectives acting as adaptive units, e.g., genomes and colonies of social insects. It rests on the suppression of the predictable tendency of evolutionary units to benefit at the expense of other units or of the wholes they contribute to (...) build. It plausibly explains human cooperation and morality: the molding of human groups into adaptive units. (shrink)

Epistemic Utility Theory is often identified with the project of *axiology-first epistemology*—the project of vindicating norms of epistemic rationality purely in terms of epistemic value. One of the central goals of axiology-first epistemology is to provide a justification of the central norm of Bayesian epistemology, Probabilism. The first part of this paper presents a new challenge to axiology first epistemology: I argue that in order to justify Probabilism in purely axiological terms, proponents of axiology first epistemology need to justify a (...) claim about epistemic value—what I label ‘Downwards Propriety’—much stronger than any they have offered justification. The second part of this paper offers an argument that this challenge cannot be met: that there is no hope for providing a purely axiological justification of Downwards Propriety, at least given widely accepted assumptions about epistemic value. (shrink)

In Part I of this series [A. Poveda, A. Rinot and D. Sinapova, Sigma-Prikry forcing I: The axioms, Canad. J. Math. 73(5) (2021) 1205–1238], we introduced a class of notions of forcing which we call [Formula: see text]-Prikry, and showed that many of the known Prikry-type notions of forcing that center around singular cardinals of countable cofinality are [Formula: see text]-Prikry. We showed that given a [Formula: see text]-Prikry poset [Formula: see text] and a [Formula: see text]-name for a non-reflecting (...) stationary set [Formula: see text], there exists a corresponding [Formula: see text]-Prikry poset that projects to [Formula: see text] and kills the stationarity of [Formula: see text]. In this paper, we develop a general scheme for iterating [Formula: see text]-Prikry posets and, as an application, we blow up the power of a countable limit of Laver-indestructible supercompact cardinals, and then iteratively kill all non-reflecting stationary subsets of its successor. This yields a model in which the singular cardinal hypothesis fails and simultaneous reflection of finite families of stationary sets holds. (shrink)

This contribution provides a new collection of the textual extant remains (reliquiae) of the Peripatetic philosopher Cratippus of Pergamon (I c. bc), and a full and detailed overview of the biographical and doctrinal features of this thinker.

Journal of Mathematical Logic, Volume 22, Issue 03, December 2022. In Part I of this series [A. Poveda, A. Rinot and D. Sinapova, Sigma-Prikry forcing I: The axioms, Canad. J. Math. 73(5) (2021) 1205–1238], we introduced a class of notions of forcing which we call [math]-Prikry, and showed that many of the known Prikry-type notions of forcing that center around singular cardinals of countable cofinality are [math]-Prikry. We showed that given a [math]-Prikry poset [math] and a [math]-name for a non-reflecting (...) stationary set [math], there exists a corresponding [math]-Prikry poset that projects to [math] and kills the stationarity of [math]. In this paper, we develop a general scheme for iterating [math]-Prikry posets and, as an application, we blow up the power of a countable limit of Laver-indestructible supercompact cardinals, and then iteratively kill all non-reflecting stationary subsets of its successor. This yields a model in which the singular cardinal hypothesis fails and simultaneous reflection of finite families of stationary sets holds. (shrink)

Many think that expressivists have a special problem with negation. I disagree. For if there is a problem with negation, I argue, it is a problem shared by those who accept some plausible claims about the nature of intentionality. Whether there is any special problem for expressivists turns, I will argue, on whether facts about what truth-conditions beliefs have can explain facts about basic inferential relations among those beliefs. And I will suggest that the answer to this last question is, (...) on most plausible attempts at solving the problem of intentionality, ‘no’. (shrink)

In 2010, Charles Scott gave a course at the Collegium Phaenomenologicum in Italy titled “Bordered Americans.” The course followed his concern with understanding philosophical thought given our concrete cultural dynamics today. The lectures addressed the question of the limits and delimitations of borders as dynamic transformative events, which occur in encroachments between distinct and ever moving and shifting cultural configurations and borders. Scott emphasized the possibilities of thinking in such spaces, and ultimately situated Continental American philosophy in such disclosure. This (...) essay is the fruit of long conversations with Scott about these issues; in it I aim to add a Latin American voice to his incisive analysis. (shrink)

Husserl desarrolla un enfoque genético que busca dar cuenta del origen de las formas lógico-categoriales a partir de las correspondientes preestructuraciones situadas en el nivel de la receptividad sensible. Para un enfoque de ese tipo, la explicación del origen de las modalidades del juicio, en general, y la negación, en particular, plantea peculiares desafíos. El presente trabajo discute el modo en el que Husserl trata la negación, en tanto forma básica de la modalidad, tanto en el enfoque estático de Ideen (...) I como en el enfoque genético de Erfahrung und Urteil. A fin de poner de relieve el al-cance histórico y sistemático de la concepción husserliana, se proporciona previamente una presentación general de su contexto polémico inmediato. Este viene dado por la oposición entre psicologismo y formalismo, dominante en la filosofía de la lógica alemana de fines del siglo XIX y comienzos del siglo XX.Husserl develops a genetic approach that seeks to account for the origin of the logical-categorical forms starting from the corresponding pre-structures located at the level of sensitive receptivity. For such an approach, the explanation of the origin of the modalities of judgment, in general, and negation, in particular, poses peculiar challenges. This paper discusses how Husserl treats negation as a basic form of modality, both in the static approach of Ideen I and the genetic approach of Erfahrung und Urteil. Previously, in order to highlight the historical and systematic significance of the Husserlian conception, a general presentation of its immediate polemic context is offered, especially with reference to the opposition between psychologism and formalism, dominant in the German philosophy of logic of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze Leibniz and Newton’s conception of space, and to point out where their agreements and disagreements lie with respect to its mode of existence. I shall offer a definite characterization of Leibniz and Newton’s conceptions of space. I will show that, according to their own concepts of substance, both Newtonian and Leibnizian spaces are not substantiva!. The reason of that consists in the fact that space is not capable of action. Moreover, there is (...) a sense in which space is relational, because their parts are individuated only by means of their mutual relations. (shrink)

In contemporary ethics, the free rider problem occurs when in a group of people who work for a common aim, someone takes advantage of the collective work and makes a comparatively lower effort than the rest of the group, receiving the same benefits. The problem consists in avoiding this behavior that, intuitively, is considered undesirable. This essay presents an analysis of the problem from three different perspectives in moral education: consequentialism, deontologic proceduralism and virtue ethics. I show the weaknesses of (...) consequentialism and of deontology to analyze and solve this problem and avoiding the undesirable behavior. Finally, I show that an examination of the problem from the perspective of virtue ethics as a model of moral education offers certain advantages over the other models. (shrink)

In this extraordinary contribution to Nietzsche studies, Robert Alejandro offers an original interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy viewed as a complete whole. Alejandro painstakingly traces the different ways in which Nietzsche reconfigured and shifted his analyses of morality and of the human condition, until he was content with the final result: nothing was dispensable; everything was necessary. This is a philosophy of reconciliation--hardly nihilism--and it is a perspective that is not adequately addressed elsewhere in the literature on Nietzsche. (...) Alejandro traces the evolution of Nietzsche's thought by identifying the different layers of his philosophy, expressed in a complex array of stories and historical narratives. Alejandro analyzes the different stories of Nietzsche, places those stories within a tradition of genealogical theorizing, and interprets both the stories and the genealogy in terms of one of Nietzsche's unique features, his use of "historiobiography." According to Alejandro, historiobiography blends the idea of an attunement with all history and one's awareness of this attunement. As a mode of philosophizing, historiobiography allows Nietzsche to view all human history as if it runs through his own life and thoughts. Alejandro argues that Nietzsche deployed three strategies to find relief from his sense of the meaninglessness of life: his magnified concept of what he himself represented in human history, his doctrine of the eternal recurrence, and his philosophy of reconciliation. "I am confident that this book will be considered essential reading for any scholar doing serious research into Nietzsche's thought and its implications.... The author carefully traces the shifts and turns and occasionally the contradictions and dead-ends in the development of Nietzsche's major themes. I have never read an account of Nietzsche's thought as fully and convincingly supported by textual reference as this book. Others will disagree with the author's readings of Nietzsche, that is the nature of scholarship, but I cannot see how they could be ignored." --_Edward Portis, Texas A & M University_ "This is a major work on Nietzsche. Robert Alejandro offers us a reading of Nietzsche's Herculean efforts that Nietzsche scholars and scholars who write about modernity and postmodernity will be unable to ignore. This wide ranging and deep book addresses major issues in cultural history, psychoanalysis, cultural anthropology, and the vast literature on modernity and secularization. I expect this to be a book that generates debate and discussion for years to come." --_Robert Hollinger, Iowa State University_ "Robert Alejandro delivers a rich, lively account of Nietzsche's quest for meaning. By focusing on the theme of _historiobiography_, Alejandro illuminates Nietzsche's bold attempt to place himself at the center of a comprehensive account of the rise and fall of Western civilization. A thoughtful, well-crafted book, written very much in the spirit of Nietzsche himself." --_Daniel Conway, Texas A & M University_. (shrink)

Examino textos de Leopoldo Lugones y de José Ingenieros, escritos para homenajear a Domingo Faustino Sarmiento en el primer centenario de su nacimiento en 1911. Mi hipótesis es que tanto Lugones como Ingenieros se proponen legitimar un gobierno de un círculo inteligente que tiene la autoridad (la palabra y la decisión), y expone, por ende, un dogma que da fundamento a la patria y a la democracia. Dicho de otro modo, todos los actores de la patria, (productores de riqueza, obreros, (...) militares, artistas, maestros, etc.,) deben ser conducidos por esta elite inteligente (a la cual pertenecen, según ellos, tanto Sarmiento como Lugones e Ingenieros). El elitismo asociado a escritores (en el caso de Lugones) o de científicos (en el caso de Ingenieros) es el eje que articula todos sus argumentos, y es desde esta perspectiva que interpretan y evocan la figura y los escritos de Sarmiento en el primer centenario de su natalicio. I scrutinize texts of Leopoldo Lugones and José Ingenieros, written to honour Domingo Faustino Sarmiento in the first centennial of his birth in 1911. My theory is that Lugones and Ingenieros intend to legitimize a government of a clever circle that has the authority (the word and the decision), and exposes, therefore, a dogma that gives foundation to motherland and democracy. In other words, all the actors of the motherland (producers of richness, workers, military men, artists, teachers, etc.) must be led by this intelligent elite (to which, according to them, Sarmiento, Lugones and Ingenieros belong). The elitism associated to writers (in Lugones's case) or to scientists (in Ingenieros's case) is the axis that articulates the whole argument and it is since this perspective that they interprete and evoke Sarmiento's figure and writings in the first hundred anniversary of his birth. (shrink)

In his comment, McGann argues that in my “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices: Making Enactivism Social,” I have overlooked a group of enactivist theories that can be grouped under the participatory sense-making label. In this reply, I explain that the omission is due to the fact that such theories are not accounts of perception. It is argued that, unlike participatory sense-making, the approach of the “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices” article does not focus on the perceptual aspects of (...) things social, but on the social aspects that are constitutive of perception in general. I conclude by underscoring the central argument of the original article: that the adequate notion to make enactivism about perception social is that of “perceptual practices,” a social practices-based notion of perception. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Lotze’s conception of judgement in the framework of his “logic of validity” . I first consider Lotze’s influence on the platonic turn of German philosophy of logic. Second, I explain how Lotze tries to overcome the traditional ontological framework by distinguishing between “being” and “validity”. Finally, I discuss Lotze’s conception of judicative content and point out its consequences for the evolution of the doctrine of judgement in neokantianism and phenomenology.

Altruism is a central concept in evolutionary biology. Evolutionary biologists still disagree about its meaning (E.O. Wilson 2005; Fletcher et al. 2006; D.S. Wilson 2008; Foster et al. 2006a, b; West et al. 2007a, 2008). Semantic disagreement appears to be quite robust and not easily overcome by attempts at clarification, suggesting that substantive conceptual issues lurk in the background. Briefly, group selection theorists define altruism as any trait that makes altruists losers to selfish traits within groups, and makes groups of (...) altruists fitter than groups of non-altruists. Inclusive fitness theorists reject a definition based on within- and between-group fitness. Traits are altruistic only if they cause a direct and absolute fitness loss to the donor. The latter definition is more restrictive and rejects as cases of altruism behaviors that are accepted by the former. Fletcher and Doebeli (2009) recently proposed a simple, direct and individually based fitness approach, which they claim returns to first principles: carriers of the genotype of interest “must, on average, end up with more net direct fitness benefits than average population members.” This seductively simple proposal uses the concept of assortment to explain how diverse kinds of altruists end up on average with more net fitness than their non-altruistic rivals. In this paper I shall argue that their approach implies a new concept of altruism that contrasts with and improves on the concept of the inclusive fitness approach. (shrink)

Liberatory thought in Latin American philosophy leads to the question of the reinterpretation of historical time consciousness. In the following pages I first introduce the challenge as articulated out of Latin American thought, particularly with reference to Enrique Dussel and Aníbal Quijano, and then I develop a reinterpretation of historical time consciousness in its happening as understood through Hans-Georg Gadamer’s discussion of effected historical consciousness in Truth and Method. As already marked by this trajectory, this essay is not comparative, but, (...) through a dialogue with these thinkers, seeks to rethink the temporalizing-historical movement that is historical consciousness as a possible path to engaging in and understanding liberatory philosophy. (shrink)

In the following pages, I am going to put forward the ethical-philosophical and anthropological keys of Meditations on Quixote. In order to do that, we pay attention to the theory of love in Ortega´s thought in the context of his first and quoted work. Ortega thought carefully about the love following an important philosophical tradition which dates back to classical times in Greece. Ortega was a philosopher and for this particular reason he considered that philosophy is the general science of (...) love; inside the intelectual globe, that represents the great impetus towards an absolute connexion. We try to justify this work in the fact that Ortega´s thought about love and hatred hasn´t been studied taking into account the ethical-philosophical and anthropological theory that appers in Meditation on Quixote. Likewise, it is true that Ortega dialogues, in the contexto of that work, with other authors, such as Sócrates, Plato, Spinoza, Nietzsche or Scheler. We will also study the social and political interferences of his reflection on love in the restoration of the Spanish monarchy. (shrink)